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Abstract
We conduct two experiements of the claim that people are overcondent. We de-
velop new tests of overplacement which are based on a formal Bayesian model. Our two
experiments, on easy quizzes, nd overplacement. More precisely, we nd apparently
overcondent data that cannot be accounted for by a rational population of expected
utility maximizers with a good understanding of the nature of the quizzes they took.
Keywords: Overcondence; Better than Average; Experimental Economics; Irra-
tionality; Signalling Models.
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1 Introduction
A large body of literature across several disciplines, including psychology, nance, and eco-
nomics, purports to nd that people are generally overcondent, at least on easy tasks.1 For
Authors are listed alphabetically. This paper was previously circulated as A Proper Test of Overcon-
dence. We thank Uriel Haran for help with data collection as well as the sta¤ and facilities of the Center
for Behavioral Decision Research at Carnegie Mellon University.
yemail: dubraj@um.edu.uy
1Papers on overcondence in economics include Camerer and Lovallo (1999) analyzing entry in an industry,
Fang and Moscarini (2005) analyzing the e¤ect of overcondence on optimal wage setting, Garcia, Sangiorgi
and Urosevic (2007) analyzing the e¢ ciency consequences of overcondence in information acquisition in
nancial markets, K½oszegi (2006) who studies how overcondence a¤ects how people choose tasks or careers,
and Menkho¤ et al. (2006) who analyze the e¤ect of overcondence on herding by fund managers. In
nance, papers include Barber and Odean (2001), Bernardo and Welch (2001), Chuang and Lee (2006),
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Peng
and Xiong (2006), and Wang (2001). See Benoît and Dubra (2011) for a discussion of some of the literature.
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economists, the issue of overcondence is of paramount importance as it a¤ects the equi-
librium outcomes in almost every market. Although the term overcondence has been
used rather broadly, Larrick, Burson, and Soll (2007) and Moore and Healy (2008) point out
that, in fact, three distinct varieties of overcondence have been examined in the literature:
(1) people having excessive condence in the their estimates, or overprecision, (2) people
overestimating their abilities, and (3) people overplacing themselves relative to others. In
this paper, we focus on the third type of overcondence, overplacement.
For the most part, researchers have not directly observed overplacement but have, instead,
inferred it from the tendency of a majority of people to claim to be superior to the median
person  the so-called better-than-average e¤ect. The better-than-average-e¤ect has been
noted for a wide range of easy skills, from driving, to spoken expression, to the ability to get
along with others.2 While this e¤ect is well-established, Benoît and Dubra (2011) (henceforth
B&D) have recently questioned its signicance. They show that better-than-average data in
and of itself merely gives the appearance that (some) people must be overplacing themselves,
but does not indicate true overplacement, which carries with it the implication that people
have made some kind of error in their self-placements.3 Because of this reason, the vast
majority of the existing experimental literature on the better-than-average e¤ect cannot
actually claim to have found overplacement. Moreover, most of the experiments by their
very design do not even have the potential of showing overplacement. In this paper, we
report on two experiments which provide a proper test of overplacement.
The most common type of experiment in this eld involves asking subjects, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, how they rank compared to others. For instance, Svenson (1981), in
perhaps the most cited study, asks subjects to estimate how their driving compares to the
others by placing themselves into one of ten successive ten percent intervals; Hoelzl and
Rustichini (2005) obtain implicit rankings by asking subjects if they are willing to bet that
they will score in the top half of their group on a vocabulary quiz. There are at least three
criticisms that can be made of this type of experiment, though not every criticism applies
to every experiment:4
1. Participants often have no material incentive to answer the question accurately and
internal motivations to answer accurately are likely to compete with other motivations,
2While early research pointed towards a universal better-than-average e¤ect, more recent work indicates
that the e¤ect is primarily for easy tasks and may be reversed for di¢ cult tasks.
3Other papers which question the signicance of the better-than-average e¤ect include Zábojník (2004)
and Brocas and Carillo (2007).
4These are criticisms of the experiments as tests of overcondence. Many of these experiments have other
purposes as well, that may not be subject to these criticisms. For instance, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005)
are also interested in understanding the better-than-average e¤ect per se and the extent to which it survives
various manipulations.
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such as appearing competent, self-condent, or modest.
2. Subjects may be uncertain of their skill levels, making the meaning of their answers
unclear.
3. The underlying theory that leads to the conclusion of overcondence has not been
carefully delineated, and the implicit theory is often erroneous.
The rst criticism is quite familiar, so let us turn to the next two. Consider a subject
who is asked to rank himself on IQ, given that the median IQ is 100. If he has not actually
taken an IQ test then he must guess at his IQ. Suppose that he believes that his IQ is 80 with
probability 0.45, 110 with probability 0.45, and 115 with probability 0.1. How should he
rank himself? He could reasonably respond that be believes himself to be of above average
intelligence, given that there is over a 50% chance that his IQ is above average. On the
other hand, he could just as reasonably respond that he is of below average intelligence,
given that his mean IQ is only 97. Thus, the subjects answer to the question gives no clear
indication of its meaning. By the same token, a statement like I believe I have a higher IQ
than the average persongives no indication of the degree of condence with which it was
uttered.5 As to the third criticism, suppose that 80% of subjects rank themselves above the
median. Experimenters have simply asserted that this is evidence of overcondence, without
a careful articulation of why this is so. The following example, which is similar to one in
B&D, illustrates the aw in this approach.
Consider a large population with three types of drivers, low skilled, medium skilled, and
high skilled, and suppose that the probabilities of any one of them causing an accident in
any single period are pL = 45 ; pM =
2
5
; and pH = 0. In period 0, nature chooses a skill level
for each person with equal probability. Initially, no driver knows his or her own skill level,
and so each person (rationally) evaluates himself as no better or worse than average. In
period 1, everyone drives and learns something about his skill, based upon whether or not
he has caused an accident. Each person is then asked how his driving skill compares to the
rest of the population. How does a driver who has not caused an accident reply?
5Note, however, that if, as a matter of fact, subjects are very sure of their types then these issues become
moot the various meanings that subjects could have for their answers converge. In addition to testing for
overcondence we test the hypothesis that subjects are not very sure of their types.Within the behavioral
economics literature, a number of papers, including Bénabou and Tirole (2002) and K½oszegi (2006), start
from the premise that people are continually learning about their types. Several strands of the psychology
literature also stress that people are uncertain of their types, including Festingers (1954) inuential social
comparison theory, Bems (1967) self-perception theory, and Amabile (1983).
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Using Bayesrule, he evaluates his own skill level as follows:
p (Low skill j No accident) =
1
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1
3
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1
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p (Medium skill j No accident) =
1
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1
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p (High skill j No accident) =
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5
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5
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Such a driver thinks there is over a 1
2
chance (in fact, 5
9
) that his skill level is in the top
third of all drivers. His mean probability of an accident is 5
9
0 + 1
3
2
5
+ 1
9
4
5
= 2
9
, which is better
than for 2
3
of the drivers, and better than the population mean. Furthermore, his beliefs
about himself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution. Any
way he looks at it, a driver who has not had an accident should evaluate himself as better
than average. Since 3
5
of drivers have not had an accident, 3
5
rationally rank themselves as
better than average.
As this example shows, the fact that 60% of drivers rank themselves above the median
does not indicate erroneous self-evaluations. In fact, Theorem 1 below shows that any
fraction less than one of people could rationally believe that they have over a 50% chance
of ranking in the top half of the population, without any overplacement being implied.
Therefore, any experiment designed just to show that more than half the population rank
themselves as likely to be better than then median cannot possibly show overplacement.
Experiments with more detailed information on how subjects place themselves in percentiles
have the potential to show overplacement, but even these must be carefully interpreted.
We conduct two experiments that enable us to perform a variety of tests with the potential
to show if people are not making rational assessments of their abilities. Both our experiments
nd overcondence, though not all the tests we run reveal this overcondence. In Section 5,
we discuss some possible limitations of these ndings. Subject to these caveats, our results
join those of Merkle and Weber (2011) and Burks et. al. (2011) who also conduct proper
tests and nd overplacement (and are subject to similar caveats). Two experiments that
conduct proper tests of overplacement, but do not nd such a bias, are Clark and Friesen
(2008) and Moore and Healy (2008).6
6Merkle and Weber (2011) and Burks et al. (2011) take explicit account of the critique of B&D. Clark
and Friesen (2008) and Moore and Healy (2008) preceded B&D, but their implicit theory of overplacement
is correct (and, in fact, corresponds to Theorem 3 of B&D).
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2 Background
When should we say that a person is overcondent? An immediate proposal is that an over-
condent person is not as skillful as she thinks she is. However, making such a determination
may be problematic, as many skills are not easily measured. For instance, consider a person
who asserts I am a very good driver. Even supposing that we can make the notion of very
goodprecise and that we can agree on what constitutes a very good driver, how are we to
determine if the statement is true? Giving the person a driving test may not be practical.
Moreover, the skills measured in such a test may not match up very well with the day-to-day
skills reected in the drivers self-assessment.
Researchers have circumvented these problems by considering entire populations at once
and asking subjects how their skills compare to each other. Beyond circumvention, there are
at least two reasons to be interested in this overplacement. Firstly, in many domains people
may well have a better idea of their relative placements than their absolute placements.
Thus, we might expect students to have a better idea of their math abilities relative to their
classmates, than of their absolute abilities. Secondly, in many areas of interest, relative
ability is of primary importance. For instance, in many jobs success depends primarily on a
persons abilities relative to his or her peers.
The basic idea behind the relative population approach is that, since only 50% of people
can be in the top 50% in skill level, if more than half the people in a population claim to
be in the top half or make choices which reveal such a belief they mustbe making an
error. However, as the example in the introduction shows, this idea is awed.
The implication in terming a population overcondent is that the members of the popu-
lation have made some errors or have some inconsistencies in their self-evaluations.7 Thus,
B&D proposes that data be called (truly) overcondent only if it cannot be obtained from a
population that derives its beliefs in a fully rational and consistent manner, as follows.
Let a rationalizing model be a four-tuple
 
; p; S; ffg2

, where   R is a type
space, p is a prior probability distribution over ; S is a set of signals, and ffg2 is a
collection of likelihood functions: each f is a probability distribution over S: The interpre-
tation of the model is the following. There is a large population of individuals. In period 0
nature draws a performance level, or type, for each individual independently from p. The
prior p is common knowledge, but individuals are not informed directly of their own type.
Rather, each agent receives information about himself from his personal experience. This
information takes the form of a signal, with an individual of type  2  receiving signal s 2
S with probability f (s). Draws of signals are conditionally independent. Given his signal
7These errors can be expected to lead to further errors, such as too many people attempting to become
professional athletes.
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and the prior p, an agent updates his beliefs about his type using Bayesrule whenever pos-
sible. Data can be rationalized if it can arise from a population whose beliefs are generated
within a rationalizing model.
Since experimental data that is typically available does not reect agentscomplete be-
liefs, data that can be rationalized may still come from a population that is not acting in a
fully rational and consistent manner. However, data that cannot be rationalized is denitely
problematic. A proper test for overcondence involves a search for data that cannot be
rationalized. The nature of the test that can be conducted depends on the type of data that
is available. Conversely, the type of data that an experimenter collects will depend upon the
test that is to be conducted. In this paper, we report on four di¤erent tests. These tests are
based on the three theorems below.
 We say that a person of type t is in the top y of a population if the fraction of people
whose type is greater than or equal to t is at most y. Thus, in a population of 100
people at most 25 can be in the top 1
4
.
 Given a population of subjects, let x (q; y) be the fraction who believe that there is a
probability at least q that their types are in the top y of the group. If the subjects had
no information pertaining to their individual abilities, then they all would believe that
they had a probability y of ranking in the top y. Thus, for q = y even a population
in which x (q; y) = 1 would not demonstrate overcondence, and a fortiori, neither
would a population of subjects who were less condent that they were in the top y
(i.e., q < y). Since we are interested in the possibility of overcondence, we conduct
experiments in which q > y and state our theorems accordingly. Theorems for the case
q  y are essentially symmetric.
Theorem 1 Suppose that a fraction x of the population believe that there is a probability at
least q that their types are in the top y < q of the population. This data can be rationalized
if and only if qx  y.
Theorem 2 Suppose that a fraction x of the population believe that there is a probability at
least q that their types are in the top y < q of the population. Let ~x be the fraction of people
who have those beliefs and whose actual type is in the top y of the population. This data can
be rationalized if and only if qx  ~x.
Theorem 3 In a population of n individuals, let ri, i = 1; :::; n, be the probability with which
individual i believes his type is in the top y of the population. This data can be rationalized
if and only if 1
n
Pn
i=1 ri = y.
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All theorems are proved in the appendix, though theorems 1 and 3 are essentially corollar-
ies of theorems found in B&D.8 Theorem 2 uses information about subjectsactual placement
in addition to their beliefs. The rst paper that we know of that uses actual placement data
to conduct a proper test of overcondence, albeit in a di¤erent way, is Burks et al. (2011).
Walton (1999) asks truckers whether or not they consider themselves to be safer drivers
than the average truckers. However, the truckers are not incentivized and the meanings of
their answers are unclear. The limitations of this study notwithstanding, it has its virtues.
The question asked is of importance to the truckers and they can be expected to have given
it some thought even prior to the study. Even the more precise questions, Are you probably
a safer driver than most?or Do you think that you are less likely to end up in an accident
than most driversare fairly natural.
Unfortunately, as Theorem 1 shows, the questions are of little use for the study of over-
condence; more information is needed. A straightforward extension of the question is to
narrow the range of placement to the top y < 1
2
, rather than the entire top half, or to
increase the condence in the placement to some q > 1
2
, or both. Beyond the question of
overcondence, part of our interest is the extent to which data like this, which is similar in
spirit to better-than-average type data, can revel overplacement. Our ndings are negative
in this regard, suggesting that more information may be needed for a proper study, and we
do conduct tests that use more information. However, there is often a trade-o¤ between the
amount of information collected, and the di¢ culty of the mechanism and the strength of the
incentives, which may make the more detailed information less reliable. We return to this
issue in Section 5.
Let us say that data passes a test based on one of the theorems if the necessary and
su¢ cient condition in that theorem is satised and fails the test otherwise. Suppose that
an experiment yields data rich enough to perform tests based on all three theorems. If the
data fails any single test, then the subjects in the experiment have beliefs that cannot be
generated from a rationalizing model, regardless of whether or not the data passes other
tests. It is trivial to see that if the data (~x; x; q) passes a test based on Theorem 2, it also
passes a test based on Theorem 1 (since ~x  y). In a sense, then, a test based on Theorem 1
is made redundant by a test based on Theorem 2if the data fails the latter test no further
testing is required, while if the data passes the latter, a test based on the former will provide
no new information. Similarly, if the data passes a test based on Theorem 3 it also passes
one based on Theorem 1 (see the appendix), so that again the latter is made redundant. On
the other hand, tests based on theorems 2 and 3 are independent of each other.
The above reasoning suggests that Theorem 1 may be of limited use. However, there
8The theorems are not exact corollaries because of slight discrepancies between the denitions used here
and in B&D.
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are several factors that make this theorem valuable. First, tests based on Theorem 1 can
be applied to pre-existing experiments for which the data needed for tests based on the
other theorems is not available. For instance, Svenson (1981) nds that 82.5% of American
subjects in his experiment claim to be in the top 30% of the subject pool in their driving skill
level. From Theorem 1, these drivers display overcondence if we make the plausible, though
by no means certain, assumption that their placement indicates an at least 50% belief that
they are in the top 30%,9 and we accept the validity of unincentivized responses, as many
psychologists do. Second, at a practical level, there may be reasons to have more condence
in data elicited for tests based on Theorem 1 than in the more detailed data elicited for tests
based on Theorem 2 or 3. Third, there are theoretical issues pertaining to the demands of
rationalization that may favour tests based on Theorem 1. We discuss points two and three
in Section 5.
3 Experiment I
From Theorem 1, we can infer overcondence if a su¢ cient fraction of people (variable x in
the theorem) believe su¢ ciently strongly (variable q) that they rank su¢ ciently high (variable
y). From Theorem 2, we can infer overcondence if too few people who rank themselves high
actually place high. In our rst experiment, we conduct tests of overplacement based on
these two theorems. First, we test if more than 60% of the subjects believe that there is at
least a 50% chance that their type is in the top 30%. Recall that Svenson found that over
80% of his American subjects placed themselves in the top 30%, but it was unclear what they
meant by this placement. We also test if too many subjects feel that there is more than a 60%
chance that they are better than the median. We choose 60% because we are independently
interested in whether a relatively small increase in the chance of receiving a prize randomly
 from 50% in a benchmark test to 60% here makes many people change their choice
behavior. Finally, we compare the beliefs of the subjects to their actual placements and
check whether these beliefs are consistent with Theorem 2.
We were interested in the extent to which previous ndings of apparent overplacement
could be shown to be actual overplacement. Prior experimental work and the theory in B&D
demonstrate that populations exhibit the better-than-average e¤ect more markedly on easy
tasks than di¢ cult ones.10 Accordingly, we gave our subjects an easy quiz.
Subjects are 134 individuals recruited through the web site of the Center for Behavioral
9Other possible interpretations include that subjects responses reect their mean beliefs about their
abilities or their modal beliefs.
10The theory in Moore and Healy (2008) predicts that a test that is easier than expected should yield more
overcondent looking data.
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Decision Research at Carnegie Mellon University<http://cbdr.cmu.edu/experiments/>. We
report the data for the 129 subjects who gave complete responses to the three choices with
which they were presented; the results are unchanged when we analyze, for each question,
all the answers we have for that question.
The experiment was advertised under the name Test yourselfalong with the following
description: Participants in this study will take a test with logic and math puzzles. How
much money people make depends on their performance and on how they choose to bet on
that performance.This wording of the recruitment instructions was chosen to be conductive
to more overcondent looking data (Camerer and Lovallo (1999) nd that excess entry
into their game (their measure of overcondence) is much larger when subjects volunteer to
participate in the experiment knowing that payo¤s will depend on skill).
Subjects had a mean age of 25 years (SD = 6.4) and 42 percent of them were male. All
subjects saw a sample test. Then, they made a series of three choices between (1) bets on
their test performance (skill) and (2) chance gambles of known probability. Subjects had to
choose one of the two for each of the three pairs of bets. Finally, they took a 20-item quiz
of math and logic puzzles. The three pairs of bets are listed below.
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Skill Option
1. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top half of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 50% of other test-takers, you
will get $10.
.
.
2. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top 30% of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 70% of other test takers, you
will get $10.
.
.
3. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top half of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 50% of other test takers, you
will get $10
.
.
Chance Option
1. There is a 50% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 5 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing
2. There is a 50% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 5 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing.
3. There is a 60% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 6 blue poker chips
and 4 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing.
Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions that crossed two treatment
variables: motivation and feedback.
The motivation manipulation varied what subjects were told about the test they were
about to take. By introducing a manipulation of motivation we hoped to observe the e¤ect
of inducing a motive to be overcondent. Many theories of overcondence assume that the
belief that one is better than others is driven by the desire to actually be better than others
(Benabou & Tirole, 2002; K½oszegi, 2006; Kunda, 1990). Therefore, peoples propensity to
overplace their performances relative to those of others ought to be greatest under those
circumstances when they are most motivated to achieve (see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).
Those in the high motivation condition read:
In this experiment, you will be taking an intelligence test. Intelligence, as you know, is
an important dimension on which people di¤er. There are many positive things associated
with higher intelligence, including the fact that more intelligent people are more likely to
get better grades and advance farther in their schooling. It may not be surprising to you
that more intelligent people also tend to earn more money professionally. Indeed, according
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to research by Beaton (1975) ten IQ points are worth about four thousand dollars in annual
salary. Childrens intelligence is a good predictor of their future economic success according
to Herrnstein and Murray (1994). Of course, this is partly because, as documented in
research by Lord, DeVader, and Alliger (1986) intelligent people are perceived to have greater
leadership potential and are given greater professional opportunities. But what may be
surprising to you is that intelligent people also tend to have signicantly better health and
longer life expectancies (see research by Gottfredson & Deary, 2004).
Those in the low motivation condition read: In this experiment, you will be taking a
test of math and logic puzzles.
Then subjects saw a set of sample test items. In order to constitute this set of sample
items, we began with a larger set of 40 test items. One half of this set was randomly chosen
for Test Set S. The other half belonged to Test Set M. Those participants who were to take
Test S saw sample items from Set M, and vice versa.
Half of the subjects (those in the feedback condition) received a histogram showing how
others had scored on the test they were about to take.
Next, subjects chose between skill and chance options for each of three bets. The order
in which the three bets appeared was varied randomly, as was whether the chance or the skill
option appeared rst for each bet. Participants were told that they would make the three
choices again after taking the test, and that one of these six choices would be randomly
selected at the end of the experiment to count for actual payo¤s.11 The choices can be
summarized as:
1. Benchmark Treatment: A 50% chance of a prize (as determined by a random draw),
or to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 50% of previous
test takers.
2. High Placement Treatment: A 50% chance of a prize (as determined by a random
draw), or to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 30%
of previous test takers.
3. Strength Treatment: A 60% chance of a prize (as determined by a random draw), or
to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 50% of previous
test takers.
Then subjects took the twenty-item test under a ten-minute time limit. The two test sets
appear in Appendix A. Subjects earned $.25 for each test question they answered correctly.
11The results we present are those of the rst set of choices; those made before taking the test. This is the
standard methodology for studying overplacement (see Moore and Healy (2008), Clark and Friesen (2008)
and Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) inter alia). The second set of bets is more informative about how good
subjects are at estimating their own scores after the fact, and we do not present this data.
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Then subjects chose between the skill and chance options for each of the three bets again.
Subjects then answered a series of questions regarding what they thought their score would
be, how they felt during the experiment, etc.
Finally, if a subject chose to bet on chance (rather than their test performance) for the
one bet that counted, an experimenter had the subject draw from the relevant bag of poker
chips to determine whether he or she won the $10 prize.
3.1 The data
There are 5 variables, none of which had any e¤ect on the choice behavior of subjects (or
their scores except for the High Motivation treatment, which decreased scores, see below).
First, as expected, neither of the following three randomizations had any e¤ect:
 The order of the presentation of the bets (123, 132, 213, etc).
 Whether the skill or random bet was presented rst in each pair.
 Whether subjects saw sample M and took test S, or saw S and took M.
Second, we didnt have a prior belief of how the feedback manipulation would a¤ect
scores or choices between bets; it had no e¤ect. Finally, and surprisingly to us, the Moti-
vation manipulation had no e¤ect either. Hence, we discuss only aggregate data, without
discriminating by treatments.
Of paramount importance to a subject is her score on the test. Thus, it is most convenient
to model a subjects typeas just being this score. This means that at the time she makes
her decision, the subject does not yet have a type. Rather, her type is a random variable
to be determined later. Formally, this poses no di¢ culties. Based on her life experiences
and the sample test she sees, the subject has a distribution over her possible types, i.e., test
scores. In the Benchmark Treatment, a subject (presumably) prefers to be rewarded based
on her placement if there is more than a 50% chance her type is in the top 50%. In the High
Placement Treatment, a subject prefers to be rewarded based on her placement if there is
more than a 50% chance her type is in the top 30%. In the Strength Treatment, a subject
prefers to be rewarded based on her placement if there is more than a 60% chance that her
type is in the top 50%.
As expected, in the Benchmark Treatment, the population displays apparent overplace-
ment: 74% choose to be rewarded based upon their placement. Barring too many equally
skilled subjects (and ignoring the possibility of errors), such a result is usually interpreted
as 74% place themselves in the top half of test takers. However, this statement is imprecise,
if not misleading. A more precise interpretation is that 74% believe that there is at least a
50% chance that they are in the top half.
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Note that these two interpretations are di¤erent and have di¤erent implications for ratio-
nality. In the rst interpretation, if we assume place themselvesindicates (near) certainty,
then the population displays overcondence, not just apparent overcondence. But the more
precise interpretation, the second interpretation, shows that the choice behavior of the sub-
jects is consistent with rationality, as indicated by Theorem 1. Overplacement can be inferred
only if the subjectsbelief that they are in the top half is su¢ ciently more than 50% or if
they believe they place su¢ ciently high within the top half.
Before turning to the question of overplacement, we consider the question of how certain
a subject is of her type. Of the 74% who opt for placing in the top half over a 50% random
draw, 22% switch and choose a 60% random draw over placing in the top half.12 Thus, a
signicant fraction of the subjects do not show much condence in their belief that they
are better than average. This fact supports the underlying premise of B&D and of Moore
and Healy (2008), that people are uncertain of their types.13 In particular, it suggests that
prior work on overcondence cannot be justied by an untested presumption that people are
certain, or nearly certain, of their types.
We turn now to the question of overplacement.14
Tests Based on Theorem 1.
From Theorem 1, the population exhibits overcondence if more than 60% vote for the
skill bet in the High Placement pair of bets, or if more than 83.3% vote for the skill bet in
the Strength pair of bets. In fact, only 51.9% and not 60% choose the skill bet in the High
Placement pair of bets, so that rationality cannot be rejected. More precisely, one can build
a rational model in which a sample at least this overcondent looking arises with probability
greater than 50% (i.e. a sample like this is very likely if the null is rationality; see Appendix
C for details). If, on the other hand, the null hypothesis is that more than 60% believe
that there is more than 50% chance of being in the top 30%, it can be rejected with 3%
12We note that 6% of the subjects favor a 50% draw over their placement, but their placement over a 60%
draw. We have no explanation for this inconsistent behaviour.
13However, our experiement does not provide a denitive test of the subjects uncertainty about their
types as they may also have been concerned about randomness in the test itself (although concern about
this randomdess should have been low since subjects were shown a quite representative sample test).
14Although it is not the focus of our study, we mention one intriguing nding. While the high/low
motivation treatment does not a¤ect the betting behaviour of our subjects, the subjects have signicantly
lower scores under the high motivation treatment. Those in the high motivation condition answered 16.6
questions correctly, whereas those in the low motivation condition answered an average of 18 questions
correctly, and an independent samples t-test reveals this di¤erence to be signicant at signicance levels
below 1%. Thus, our subjects appear to chokeunder pressure, as has been documented by other studies,
including Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar (2005), Beilock and Carr (2001), Dohmen (2005), and
Markman and Maddox (2006). In the present context, this nding is interesting in that it speaks to the
potential adaptiveness (or lack thereof) of motivations to be condent.
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signicance (a t test with 128 degrees of freedom reveals that 51.9% is di¤erent from 60%
at the 3% signicance level). Also, only 64.3% and not 83.3% choose the skill bet in the
Strength pair. Again, a sample as apparently overcondent as this, or more, has a likelihood
greater than 50% in a rational model, and one can reject the null that more than 83.3% of
the population believes there is a chance greater than 60% that they will score in the top
half with a condence greater than 99% (a t test with 128 degrees of freedom reveals that
64.3% is di¤erent from 83.3% at signicance levels lower than 1%).
Although the results from these tests are consistent with no overcondence, they do not
rule out overcondence since, perhaps inevitably, they only reect a fraction of the subjects
beliefs. The fact that we have information on actual test performance allows us to conduct
more stringent tests based on Theorem 2.
Tests Based on Theorem 2.
From Theorem 2:
1. At least 60% of the of subjects who bet on themselves in the strength treatment should
have scores in the top half. In fact, only 54.9% of those who bet this way place in the
top half.15 However, while 54:9 is less than 60; the following statistical test reveals that
in a rational model, there is a 16.7% chance that a sample as apparently overcondent
as this, or more, will arise. Consider a rationalizing model, with 2 types, each with
probability 1
2
, and 2 signals, and 64:3% observe the high signal (which has a posterior
of 60% in the high type). In samples of 129 individuals, in which 64.3% observe the
high signal, the chance that 54.9% or less of those individuals will score in the top half
is 16.7% (so we cant reject rationality16).
2. At least half of the 52% of subjects who bet on themselves in the high placement
treatment should have scores in the top 30%. In fact, only 32.8% (and not 50%)
of those who bet this way do place in the top 30%.17 The following statistical test
15Some care must be taken in determining the percentage who place in the top half, that is who place
among the top 65 subjects. The median score is 18. There are 54 subjects who score more than 18 and 18
subjects who score exactly 18. Hence, 11 of the 18 who score 18 are randomly chosen to place in the top
half. There are 14 individuals who both score 18 and claim to be in the top half, so that 14  1118  9 of them
end up in the top half. Together with the 37 who claim to be in the top half and score above 18, we have
that 46 out of the 83 (54.9%) who bet on their score actually placed in the top half.
16If we round the 14  1118 = 8: 555 6 of the previous footnote to 9; instead of the conservative 8, the
probability of the sample increases to 22.9%.
17The top 30% of test takers is 39 and 21 score more than the cuto¤ for the 30th percentile (cuto¤ is 19),
while 33 score 19. Hence, 18 out of those 33 place in the top 30%. There are 17 individuals who score the
cuto¤ score 19, and claim to be in the top half, so 17  1833  9 of them end up in the top 30%; together with
the 13 who claim to be in the top 30% and score in that range, we have that 22 out of the 67 (32.8%) who
bet on their score actually placed in the top 30%.
14
reveals that in the rational model that maximizes the chance of a sample as apparently
overcondent as this one (or more), the likelihood of this much apparent overcondence
is less than 1%. Consider a two type- two signal model, in which the high type has
probability 30%, and the high signal has a chance of 52% (which has a posterior of
50% in the high type). In samples of 129 individuals, in which 52% observe the high
signal, the chance that 32.8% or less of those individuals will score in the top 30% is
less than 1% (so we reject rationality).
Combining the results from tests based on theorems 1 and 2, the data passes three out
of four tests. However, to be rational, the data must pass all tests. Thus, Experiment I
rejects the hypothesis that subjects are behaving rationally, although the tests based just on
Theorem 1 could not rule out rationality.
4 Experiment II
In this section we report on a second experiment, that allows for a test based on Theorem
3, as well as tests based on the rst two theorems. The experiment is very similar in its
overall design to Experiment I. It again involves Carnegie Mellon undergraduates, 74 this
time, taking a quiz very similar to the previous ones. The crucial di¤erence is that subjects
were asked, in an incentive compatible manner, to indicate the likelihood they ascribed to
placing in the top half. The elicitation mechanism used was the probability matching rule
described by Karni (2009) and Grether (1981), as implemented by steps 3 and 6 below. The
steps of the experiment were:
1. Participants took a ve-item practice quiz. They had 2.5 minutes. A record was kept
of their score.
2. The experimenter described the probability matching rule and its incentive properties.
3. Participants indicated how likely they thought it would be that they would rank in the
top half of quiz takers by choosing a probability from a drop-down menu. The menu
listed the probabilities from 0% to 100% in 2% increments. Because of the nature of
the interface, the menu had a probability on which it started this probability was
randomly determined for each participant.
4. Participants who indicated an 86% or larger probability of scoring in the top half, were
presented the following additional bet: Choose between the following two options, a)
Lose $1 if your score is not in the top half, or b) Lose $1 with a chance of 20%.
Participants did not know beforehand that this extra bet would be proposed.
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5. After these choices, subjects took the twenty item quiz. They had 10 minutes.
6. The computer chose an even number uniformly from 2% to 100%. Participants who had
indicated a number larger than that chosen by the computer, were rewarded according
to whether their score was in the top half; those who had chosen a number equal or
lower to that of the computer drew a bingo ball from a cage with even numbers from
2 to 100. If number on the ball was equal to lower than the number chosen by the
computer, they won $10.
With the probability matching rule, it is optimal for expected utility maximizing sub-
jects to report their true subjective probabilities when they can choose any number from
the interval [0; 100]. There is a wrinkle in the experiment, however, as subjects and the
randomizing device were both restricted to choosing even numbers. With this restriction,
if a subjects subjective probability of success is not an even number, it is optimal for the
subject to round up to the next highest even number, though this fact was not emphasized.
The reason for Step 4 is that we wanted to make sure that people who chose a very
high probability really meant it. Therefore, we checked if participants who indicated a
probability above 84% would act consistently with this estimate when presented with another
bet that implied at least an 80% chance of ending in the top half. Of the fteen people who
indicated a probability above 84%, thirteen followed up in a consistent manner by choosing
4a over 4b.
From Theorem 3, the average of the likelihoods of ending in the top half given by partici-
pants should be 50% in a rational population, although given the restriction to even numbers
and the rounding noted above, this gure could rationally be almost up to 52% in the exper-
iment. The actual average given was 67.2%, which is greater than 50% at all conventional
condence levels: the t statistic with 73 degrees of freedom is 7.06, which yields a p value of
less than 1%: Thus, this test rejects the hypothesis that subjects were behaving rationally.
Tests based on theorems 1 and 2.
The data which was gathered also enables us to conduct an additional nineteen tests based
on Theorem 1 and sixteen based on Theorem 2. For instance, 35% of subjects indicated that
they have a probability of at least 0:8 of ending in the top half. From Theorem 1, up
to 62% of subjects could rationally make such an indication, so the data passes this test.
(More precisely, one can build a rational model in which a sample at least this apparently
overcondent, has a greater than 50% chance (so one cant reject rationality); and one can
reject the hypothesis that more than 62% of subjects believe that there is a greater than
80% chance that they are in the top half with condence levels greater than 99% (the t
statistic, for the test that 62% is signicantly di¤erent from 35%, has 73 degrees of freedom
and is  4:9)). At the same time 58% of these subjects are actually in the top half. From
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Theorem 2, at least 80% should be. The data passes the rst test and fails the second test.
(Specically, x a rational model in which 35% of a sample of 74 individuals claim to be in
the top half with probability at least 80%; the probability that at most 58% of them or less
actually score in the top half is at most 0:8%:)
A complete list of the tests is provided in the appendix. Although, the test based on
Theorem 3 indicates that the beliefs from Experiment II cannot be rationalized, the data
passes every test based on Theorem 1. At the same time, the data fails six tests based on
Theorem 2 at the 5% condence level, and fails eight tests at the 10% condence level. This
is consistent with the results of Experiment I, where tests based on Theorem 1 were not
stringent enough to detect overcondence.
4.1 Unskilled and Unaware
Kruger and Dunning (1999) ask subjects to rank themselves on a variety of skills. They
nd that subjects in the lower quartiles overplace themselves, while subjects in the highest
quartile underplace themselves. From this they conclude that overcondence is the result of
subjects who are, in their words, unskilled and unawareof their lack of skill. However, the
design of their experiment is subject to the criticism of B&D that the subjectsself-rankings
could, in fact, be perfectly rational.18 Nonetheless, our results provide support for their
conclusion. In the table below, we show the betting behaviour and placement of subjects as
a function of their score on the sample test.
Score on Sample 0 1 2 3 4 5
# with score 3 1 3 14 22 31
Average bet 55 60 26 68 69 71
% in top half 33 0 0 36 41 71
Notably, those who scored ve on average predicted they had a 71% chance of being in
the top half and 71% ended up in the top half. The overcondence stems from those who
scored three or four. (Only 10% of the subjects score two or less, and ignoring this data has
virtually no e¤ect on our results.) While these subjects had around a 40% chance of ending
up in the top half, they behaved as if they were as skilled as those who scored a ve, also
predicting around a 70% chance of ending up in the top half . These subjects appear to have
been relatively unskilled, and unaware of it.
18In addition, Ackerman, Beier, and Bowen (2002) argue that Kruger and Dunnings nding is actually an
example of regression to the mean, though Kruger and Dunning dispute this. See also Krueger and Mueller
(2002).
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5 Discussion
5.1 Critical Assessment of Data
All our subjects were incentivized to accurately report their beliefs, either implicitly of
explicitly. Despite this, there are at least two reasons why the data could be questioned.
1. Subjects may have had goals beyond the maximization of utility derived from their
monetary payments. There is evidence that people like to exert control over their situ-
ations, and so subjects may have preferred to bet on themselves even in if they thought
their chance of doing well was relatively poor (see Heath and Tversky (1991), Goodie
(2003), Goodie and Young (2007) and the references therein). Subjects may also have
liked to bet on themselves to present themselves in a positive light. Such motivations
would compete with losses in payment. Subjects stood to gain $10 from winning a
bet. While this amount of money is a decent amount for the subject population, it
(inevitably) overstates the incentives. For example, in Experiment I, a subject who
bets on herself in the strength treatment even though she believes she has only a 30%
chance of nishing in the top half, thus implicitly overstating her probability of success
by 30%, makes an expected loss of $3 from this sub-optimal choice.19 In Experiment
II, a subject who overstates her probability of nishing in the top half by 30% makes
an expected loss of less than 54 cents (see the appendix). On this accounting, the
overcondence from both experiments may be overstated, and the data from Experi-
ment II may be less reliable than the data from Experiment I. Similar caveats apply
to the data from Burks et al. (2010). While they incentivize their subjects to place
themselves into their most likely quintile, a subjects loss in payment from stating a
higher quintile may be quite small.20
2. Although it was carefully explained to subjects in Experiment II that declaring their
true values was a dominant strategy, the argument is a bit subtle and it is possible that
subjects did not understand it.21 For instance, some subjects may have erroneously
reasoned that, since stating a higher value ensures that when the randomizing device is
used, on average it has a higher probability of succeeding, it is desirable to overstate.22
19In fact, subjects placed six bets and were rewarded based on test chosen at random. This calculation
assumes that subjects consistently overstate across the bets. Overstating only on some bets reduces the
expected loss.
20Merkle and Weber (2011) do not report the exact formula they use to reward their subjects, so we cannot
estimate subjectslosses from overplacing.
21Teachers of auction theory know that the simpler proposition that bidding ones value is a dominant
strategy in a second price private value auction is far from obvious to most students
22See also Plott and Zeiler (2005) whose results show that some of the ndings conrming the endowment
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Similarly, Merkle and Weber (2011) use the Quadratic Scoring Rule to elicit beliefs 
a rule that is also not very intuitive. (Hollard et al. (2010) test the Quadratic Scoring
Rule against the Probability Matching Rule for the elicitation of subjective probabilities
and nd that the Probability Matching Rule provides more accurate beliefs.)
The above two points suggest that our ndings of overcondence may be overstated, more
so for Experiment II than Experiment I. Since our two experiments were very similar in terms
of the subject population and the quizzes they took, it makes sense to compare the results
from the two to see if there is evidence that subjects are overplacing themselves in Experiment
II relative to the Experiment I. In Experiment I, 74% of subjects bet on themselves to place
in the top half. If we ignore the above two caveats and assume the subjects were expected
utility maximizers, 74% of the population believed they had at least a 50% chance of placing
in the top half. In Experiment II, 90.5% of subjects reported at least a 50% chance placing
in the top half, which is signicantly greater than 74%. However, thirteen of these subjects
report a probability of exactly 50. If we make a genericity assumption and assume that all
the 50s are the result of rounding up (to the nearest even number) in a rational manner, then
they should be excluded. Alternatively, if we make a genericity assumption in Experiment I
and assume that none of the subjects were indi¤erent when they made their choices, then we
have that all those who bet on themselves strictly preferred this to a 50/50 bet, so that again
we should exclude all those who state 50 in Experiment II when making our comparison.
If we exclude these thirteen subjects, then we have that 73% of subjects place themselves
in the top half, a gure almost identical to the 74% in Experiment I. If we take the middle
ground and exclude half the subjects who said 50% in Experiment I we have that 82% place
themselves in the top half in Experiment II, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
two samples have the same mean: the t statistic for 2 samples with unequal variances is 1:11;
and has 165 degrees of freedom; the p value is 26.7%.
Similarly, in Experiment I 64% indicate a belief of at least 60% that they place in the top
half. In Experiment II, 72% indicate a probability of at least 60%. If we exclude those who
say say exactly 60, then the relevant gure for comparison is 61%, which is almost identical
to the 64% from the rst experiment. If we exclude half of those who say 60%, we have that
66% of those in Experiment II believe there is at least a 60% chance that they are in the
top half, and we cant reject the hypothesis that the two samples have the same mean: the
t statistic for 2 samples with unequal variances is 0:26; and has 153 degrees of freedom; the
p value is 78.8%.
Thus, there is some limited evidence that the mechanism used in Experiment II did not,
in fact, cause participants to overstate their placement relative to the mechanism used in
e¤ect may have been the result of poor training by subjects on the Becker-DeGroot mechanism, which is the
basis of the probability matching method we use.
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Experiment I.
5.2 A Reassesment of the Theory
Administering a quiz allows us to incentivize subjects in a way that is di¢ cult to do when
asking them about, say, their driving or managerial skills. However, this type of experiment
su¤ers from the fact that the subjects must reect not only upon their skills but also upon
the nature of the quiz they are taking. Moore and Healy (2008) show that when subjects
face a quiz that is easier than they expected it to be, even Bayesian reasoning may result in
data that cannot be rationalized. The reason is that a subject who does well on the sample
questions will be uncertain if this is because he is particularly skilled at this type of quiz or
because the quiz is easy (so that many people will do well). He will rationally put weight on
both possibilities and if the quiz is, in fact, easy, he will have placed too much weight on his
skill (ex post). More generally, if subjects are uncertain of the actual distribution of scores,
the data may misleadingly seem overcondent (see B&D (2011) for a discussion). In order
to mitigate this problem, subjects in both our experiments were told how well populations
had performed on these quizzes in the past. (As far as we can tell, subjects in Merkle and
Weber (2011) or Burks et al. (2011), were not given much information on the di¢ culty of the
quizzes they were taking so that results in these papers may be vulnerable to this critique.)
There is still another issue, which manifests itself when applying Theorem 2. Subjects
must consider not only the ease of the test, but its diagnostic value as well. To understand
this issue, suppose that a large group of subjects is to take a quiz billed as an examination of
logical reasoning. Suppose that, based on their life experiences to date, 40% of the subjects
rationally hold the belief that they have at least a 50% chance of ranking in the top 30%
on logical ability. Moreover, subjects (have been led to) believe that the examination they
are to take is a perfect discriminator of logical ability. Hence, 40% of subjects believe that
they have at least a 50% chance of placing in the top 30% on the quiz. This data passes
Theorem 1, as it should. Suppose, however, that, contrary to the subjectsbelief, the quiz
is, in fact, poorly designed and graded so that scores on it are completely arbitrary all
subjects are equally like to score in the top 30%. Then, with a large population, only 30%
of the subjects who believe that they have at least a 50% chance of placing in the top 30%,
actually place there. The data fails a test based on Theorem 2, even though the subjects
are not overcondent. Similarly, if subjects thought the test was one of inductive reasoning,
but it was actually one of deductive reasoning, and these skills were imperfectly matched,
data might misleadingly fail a test based on Theorem 2.23 A similar caveat applies to the
test used in Burks et al. Such a test is correctly picking up on the fact that subjects have
23A similar caveat applies to the test of Burks et al. (2010).
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made an error, but the error is one of misunderstanding the nature of the test, not one of
overcondence.
Thus far, we have described an erroron the part of the subjects who do not properly
understand the quizzes they are facing. However, it may instead be the analyst who is
making a mistake. Suppose that all subjects correctly understand that some quizzes are more
diagnostically valid than others. Moreover, they use the actual distribution of quiz types in
the world in making their Bayesian calculations. These subjects are perfectly rational and
understand the di¤ering nature of quizzes perfectly, although they have imperfect information
about the particular quiz they are taking. Correctly averaging data over all populations
taking all quizzes, the data will pass a test based on Theorem 2. However, the experimenter 
in the present case us is applying the test to this particular experiment, and is unavoidably
not averaging across all experiments. The data may fail the test, but now it is the analyst
who is making an error, not the subjects.24
6 Conclusion
There is a large body of experiments establishing the better-than-average e¤ect on easy tasks.
However, the body of experiments that employ a proper test of overplacement is quite small.
The results in this literature are more mixed, with some experiments showing overplacement
and others nding none. Our two experiments, on easy quizzes, nd overplacement. More
precisely, we nd apparently overcondent data that cannot be accounted for by a rational
population of expected utility maximizers with a good understanding of the nature of the
quizzes they took. We have discussed some of the limitations of the approach we have
taken, both for our experiments and similar experiments. However, this is not to deny the
virtues of this approach. Our belief is that the jury is still out on the big question of how
common overplacement actually is and how substantial the e¤ect is. Moreover, questions
remain regarding the motives underlying overplacement beliefs, including motives to appear
condent, smart, capable, and humble, both to others and to the self.
7 Appendix A: Test items from the two tests
1S) Susie has a cake that she splits into six pieces to share with all her friends. If each person
with a piece of cake then splits their piece in half to give to another friend, how many pieces
of cake are there in the end? 12
24Similarly, with respect to our earlier point on the ease of tests, subjects may correctly understand that
some tests are easier than others, while the analyst fails to average across all tests. See B&D for more on
this issue.
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1M) The Maroons are rst in the league and the Browns are fth while the Blues are
between them. If the Grays have more points than the Violets and the Violets are exactly
below the Blues then who is second? The Grays
2S) A bridge consists of 10 sections; each section is 2.5 meters long. How far is it from
the edge of the bridge to the center? 12.5 m
2M) Five friends share three oranges equally. Each orange contains ten wedges. How
many wedges does each friend receive? 6
3S) There are four equally spaced beads on a circle. How many straight lines are needed
to connect each bead with every other bead? 6
3M) Fall is to Summer as Monday is to _____? Sunday
4S) HAND is to Glove as HEAD is to _____? Hat
4M) What is the minimum number of toothpicks necessary to spell the word "HAT".
(You are not allowed to break or bend any toothpicks, or use one toothpick as a part of more
than one letter.) 8
5S) John needs 13 bottles of water from the store. John can only carry 3 at a time.
Whats the minimum number of trips John needs to make to the store? 5
5M) Milk is to glass as soup is to _____? bowl
6S) LIVED is to DEVIL as 6323 is to _____? 3236
6M) Which number should be next in the sequence: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ? 64
7S) If the day before yesterday is two days after Monday then what day is it today?
Friday
7M) A rancher is building an open-ended (straight) fence by stringing wire between posts
25 meters apart. If the fence is 100 meters long how many posts should the rancher use?
5
8S) Which number should come next in the series: 3, 9, 6, 12, 9, 15, 12, 18, ? 15
8M) Meowis to a cat as Moois to _____? Cow
9S) Which letter logically follows in this sequence: T, Q, N, K, H, ? E
9M) Which word does not belong in the group with the other words? Brown, Black,
Broom, Orange, Bread Orange
10S) If two typists can type two pages in ve minutes, how many typists will it take to
type twenty pages in ten minutes? 10
10M) If a woman is 21 and is half the age of her mom, how old will the mom be when
the woman is 42? 63
11S) Tiger is to stripes as leopard is to _____? Spots
11M) Which number should come next: 514, 64, 8, 1, 1/8, ? 1/64
12S) Brother is to sister as nephew is to _____? Niece
12M) Which number should come next in this series: 1 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 5 - 8 - 13 - ? 21
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13S) Desert is to oasis as ocean is to _____? Island
13M) If 10 missionaries have 3 children each, but only two thirds of the children survive,
how many children survive? 20
14S) Kara has $100. She decides to put 20% in savings, donate 20% to a charity, spend
40% on bills, and use 20% for a shopping spree. How much money does she have left over
afterwards? $0
14M) Kimberly makes $20 per hour and works for 20 hours each week. How much does
she make in a week? 400
15S) How many straight lines are needed to divide a regular hexagon into 6 identical
triangles? 3
15M) Which number should come next in this series: 1,4,9,16,25,? 36
16S) What is the average of 12, 6 and 9? 9
16M) DIDIIDID is to 49499494 as DIIDIIDD is to _____? 49949944
17S) There are three 600 ml water bottles. Two are full, the third is 2/3rds full. How
much water is there total? 1600ml
17M) If a wood pile contains 30 kilos of wood and 15.5 kilos are burned, how many kilos
are left? 14.5
18S) Which letter does not belong in the following series: D - F - H - J - K - N - P - R
K
18M) Joe was both 5th highest and 5th lowest in a race. How many people participated?
9
19S) If a certain type of bug lives for only 20 days, how old is the bug when it has lived
half of its lifespan? 10 days
19M) PEACH is to HCAEP as 46251 is to _____? 15264
20S) Begin is to began as ght is to _____? Fought
20M) Nurse is to hospital as teacher is to _____? school
8 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Su¢ ciency. Set  = fl; hg and S = fsh; slg ; let the joint
probability distribution of types and signals be
l h
sl 1  y   (1  q)x y   qx
sh (1  q)x qx
(1)
Since 0  1   y
q
= 1   y   (1  q) y
q
 1   y   (1  q)x  1; all the numbers in the matrix
are in [0; 1] : Also, a signal sh has probability x; and makes the individual believe that there
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is a chance of at least q that he is in the top y of the population. If x = 1; the proof of
su¢ ciency is nished; if x < 1; a signal of sl has probability 1   x and after it, the belief
that the type is h is
y qx
1 x < q , y < q; so exactly x people believe their type is in the top
y with probability at least q:
Necessity. Let
 
; p; S; ffg2

be a rationalizing model which rationalizes the data.
Since a fraction x believe there is a positive probability that their types are in the top y,
there is a ^ such that P

  ^

 y: Let  = min
n
^ : P

  ^

 y
o
. Let Sh denote the
set of signals such that P
 
   j s 2 Sh
  q. We have
y  P     = P     j ShP (Sh)+P     j S n Sh (1  P (Sh))  P     j ShP (Sh)  qx:
Proof of Theorem 2. Su¢ ciency. Set  = fl; hg and S = fsh; slg ; and let the joint
probability of types and signals be
l h
sl 1  y + ~x  x y   ~x
sh x  ~x ~x
(2)
Since q > y  ~x; we obtain 1  y > 1  q  (1  q) ~x
q
= ~x
q
  ~x  x  ~x so that all numbers
in the matrix are in [0; 1] : Moreover, a signal of sh has probability x; and the posterior of
h is ~xx  q; so that people observing sh have a belief of at least q that their type is in the
top y of the population. If x = 1; the proof of su¢ ciency is done. If x < 1; since y < q and
~x  qx; a signal of sl assigns a probability y ~x1 x < q to h and therefore those who observe
signal sl do not declare their type in the top y with probability at least q:
Necessity. Let
 
; p; S; ffg2

be any rationalizing model which rationalizes the data.
Since a fraction x believe there is a positive probability that their types are in the top y,
there is a ^ such that P

  ^

 y: Let  = min
n
^ : P

  ^

 y
o
. Let Sh denote the
set of signals such that P
 
   j s 2 Sh
  q. We have
~x = P
 
  &Sh

= P
 
   j Sh

P (Sh)  qx:
The next proposition shows that if the data passes a test based on Theorem 3, it also
passes one based on Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that in a population of n individuals, ri, i = 1; :::; n, is the proba-
bility with which individual i believes his type is in the top y; and suppose that in that same
population, a fraction x of the population believe that there is a probability at least q that
their types are in the top y < q of the population. If 1
n
Pn
i=1 ri = y then qx  y
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Proof. Let Z = fi 2 f1; :::; ng j i believes there is a probability at least q he is in top yg :
Then,
y =
1
n
nX
i=1
ri =
1
n
X
i2Z
ri +
1
n
X
i 62Z
ri  1
n
X
i2Z
ri  1
n
X
i2Z
q = qx;
as was to be shown.
Our mechanism in Experiment II can be summarized as follows: say a number n between
1 and 50; the computer selects a number x 2 [1; 50] \ N: If x  n; you win $10 with
probability 2x (we draw a bingo ball, and if it is lower than 2x you win $10); if x < n; you
win $10 if your score is in the top half.
What is the value of reporting n when the belief is b?
v (b; n) =
Px=n 1
x=1
1
50
b
50
10 +
Px=50
x=n
1
50
x
50
10 =
1
500
n  1
250
b+
1
250
bn  1
500
n2 +
51
10
Since the mechanism elicits the smallest even number larger than the individuals belief,
suppose the individual must round up his belief b to b+ r; for r < 2: Then, if the individual
overstates changes his optimal bet by 30%, it means he is declaring an n = b+ 15 + r; so
v (b; b+ r)  v (b; b+ 15 + r) = 21 + 3r
50
< 54 cents.
9 Appendix C: Tests in Experiment II
Table 1 below lists the data from Experiment II, organized to perform tests based on theorems
1 and 2. Reading across, for instance, the third row, the rst entry indicates that people
are placing themselves in the top 50%, the second entry indicates a probability of at least
60% of placing there, the third entry indicates that 71:6% of the subjects have stated a
probability of at least 60% of placing there, the fourth entry multiplies together the second
and third entry, the fth entry indicates a t statistic and a p-value for a test that the data
comes from a population in which y
q
or more of the population think they are in the top y
with probability at least q, the sixth entry indicates that 43:2% of the subjects have stated
a probability of at least 60% of placing in the top half and have placed in the top half and
the seventh entry indicates the probability that in a particular rational model (the one that
maximizes the chance that, in a sample in which x claim to be in the top y; a fraction ~x will
claim to be in the top y and score there), in a sample in which x claim to be in the top y; a
fraction ~x or less claim to be in the top y and score there.
For each row in the table, three tests can be conducted, in principle. Based on Theorem 1,
if it were the case that qx > y; one could ask whether this di¤erence is statistically signicant
using as a null rationality (rst test), or using as a null a particular form of irrationality
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(second test). It is easy to check that if qx  y; then with  = fl; hg, S = fsl; shg ;
p (h) =
1
2
and likelihood functions given by
l h
sl 1  (1  q)x 1  qx
sh (1  q)x qx
(3)
the likelihood of a sample in which at least x% of the population declares to be in the top
y = 1
2
of the population is greater than 50%. Since in every case y > qx; rationality can
never be rejected. The table then presents, for each line, a test of the hypothesis that the
sample comes from a population in which a proportion greater than y
q
has a belief that they
are in the top y with probability at least q (i.e. the null is a particular form of irrationality).
The fth column presents the t statistic for that test, and the p value (for a distribution
with 73 degrees of freedom). This form of irrationality is rejected in every case: in two cases
the p value is 1:5%, in the rest it is less than 1%:
The third set of tests is as follows. Given (y; q; x; ~x) ; set  = fl; hg, S = fsl; shg ;
p (h) =
1
2
: We then choose the likelihood functions to maximize the probability that a
proportion x will observe signal sh; this yields
fl (sh) + fh (sh)
2
= x:
In order for the conditional of h given sh to be at least q we need
p (h j sh) =
fh (sh)
1
2
fl (sh)
1
2
+ fh (sh)
1
2
 q , fh (sh) 
q
1  qfl (sh) :
 It is easy to check that if ~x  qx then the following likelihood functions
l h
sl 1  2 (x  ~x) 1  2~x
sh 2 (x  ~x) 2~x
(4)
maximize the likelihood that in a sample in which x claim to be in the top y; a fraction
~x will claim to be in the top y and score there. Recall that because ~x is the fraction
of people who claim to be in the top half, and are actually in the top half, we obtain
1
2
 ~x; this implies that fh is indeed a probability distribution. Also, since 12 = y  q
in the table below, we have (1  q)x  x
2
 1
2
) x  qx + 1
2
 ~x + 1
2
; which implies
that fl is also a probability distribution. With the model in (4) the likelihood that in
a sample in which x claim to be in the top y; a fraction ~x or less claim to be in the top
y and score there is always greater than 50%, as reported in the last column of Table
1 (see for example the rst three rows of the table).
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 Suppose instead that ~x < qx: The likelihood functions that maximize the probability
that, conditional on x claiming to be in the top y; a fraction ~x will claim to be in the
top y and score there are given by (3). The likelihood that, in a sample in which x
claim to be in the top y; a fraction ~x or less claim to be in the top y and score there
are also reported in the last column of Table 1.
Table 1
Test based on Theorem 1 Test based on Theorem 2
y q x qx t  stat; p value ~x Likelihood
50% 50% 67
74
= 90:5% 45:3%  1; 0 35
74
= 47:3% > 50%
50% 58% 54
74
= 73:0% 42:3%  2:55; 0:6% 33
74
= 44:6% > 50%
50% 60% 53
74
= 71:6% 43:0%  2:22; 1:5% 32
74
= 43:2% > 50%
50% 66% 45
74
= 60:8% 40:1%  2:62; 0:5% 27
74
= 36:5% 24:2%
50% 68% 44
74
= 59:4% 40:4%  2:45; 1:5% 26
74
= 35:1% 13:5%
50% 70% 41
74
= 55:4% 38:8%  2:75; 0:4% 24
74
= 32:4% 7:9%
50% 72% 32
74
= 43:2% 30:4%  4:5;< 0:1%
50% 74% 31
74
= 41:9% 31:0%  4:5;< 0:1% 18
74
= 24:3% 3:9%
50% 76% 30
74
= 40:5% 30:8%  4:4;< 0:1% 17
74
= 23:0% 1:5%
50% 78% 27
74
= 36:5% 28:5%  4:9;< 0:1% 16
74
= 21:6% 2:2%
50% 80% 26
74
= 35:1% 28:1%  4:9;< 0:1% 15
74
= 20:3% 0:8%
50% 84% 17
74
= 23:0% 19:3%  7:4;< 0:1%
50% 86% 15
74
= 20:3% 17:4%  8:0;< 0:1% 11
74
= 14:9% 14:8%
50% 88% 14
74
= 18:9% 16:7%  8:3;< 0:1% 10
74
= 13:5% 7:7%
50% 90% 13
74
= 17:6% 15:8%  8:5;< 0:1% 9
74
= 12:2% 3:4%
50% 92% 6
74
= 8:1% 7:5%  14;< 0:1%
50% 94% 5
74
= 6:8% 6:4%  15;< 0:1% 4
74
= 5:4% 3:2%
50% 96% 4
74
= 5:4% 5:2%  17;< 0:1%
50% 98% 3
74
= 4:1% 3:9%  20;< 0:1% 3
74
= 4:1% 15:1%
50% 100% 2
74
= 2:7% 2:7%  25;< 0:1% 2
74
= 2:7% > 50%
The value ~x is calculated as follows (a similar calculation was made for Experiment I).
A total of 27 people scored 19 or 20, and 13 score 18 (the median score). Hence, if a person
scores 18, his chance of being in the top half of test takers is 74=2 27
13
= 10
13
: For each line in
the table above we determine how many of the individuals claimed to be in the top 50%
with probability greater than q; score 19 or 20; to those we add a proportion 10
13
of those who
claimed to be in the top 50% with probability greater than q and scored 18:
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